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Admissibility of Remedial Measures Evidence in




In the years since the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated,
there has been considerable debate over whether the exclusion of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures1 should extend to actions based
on strict products liability. 2 This problem has been addressed at two
levels: first, whether the federal rules should apply at all when federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity or the exercise of pendent jurisdiction;
3
and second, if the federal rules do control, whether they require the ex-
clusion of remedial measures evidence when strict liability is the theory
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. FED. R. EVID. 407 states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admis-
sible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
2. See, e.g., Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial
Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict
Tort Liability, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 187 (1986); Madden, Admissibility of Post-Incident Remedial
Measures: A Pattern Emerges, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 1 (1982); Note, Subsequent Remedial Meas-
ures in Strict Liability: Later Opinions as Evidence of Defects in Earlier Reasoning, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 895 (1983) [hereinafter Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability]; Note,
The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Sugges-
tions Regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415 (1982).
3. Compare, e.g., Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984) (in diversity cases where established state law does not exclude remedial meas-
ures evidence for a substantive policy reason, the evidence may not be excluded under rule
407) with Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (excluding reme-
dial measures evidence is a "procedural judgment" allowing federal law to control despite
substantive consequences intended by Congress). For a discussion of the implications of the
rules announced in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), see Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence in Diver-
sity Actions Based on Strict Products Liability, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (1985).
[1171]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of the action.4 The United States Courts of Appeals have answered both
of these questions differently. The resulting discord has produced uncer-
tainty for litigants and has encouraged forum shopping.
Since 1982, several Senate bills providing for a national products
liability statute have contained provisions that would unify the law re-
garding admissibility of remedial measures evidence. 5 Given the impact
of products liability litigation on interstate commerce and the wide range
of standards found in state strict liability laws, Congress understandably
is attempting to address the substantive issues of products liability law. 6
If such a move succeeds, it will be even more important that the evidence
law governing strict liability claims be uniform. Continuing to allow dif-
ferent treatment of the same evidence, depending only upon the location
of the trial, would defeat the main purpose of enacting substantive legis-
lation on a national level, which is to ensure uniform resolution of litiga-
tion. Not only would the results still be unpredictable, but forum
shopping would continue to be a desirable stratagem.
This Note surveys current judicial and legislative treatment of sub-
sequent remedial measures evidence and argues that a uniform federal
standard should be adopted. Section I examines the federal appellate
courts' reasoning in the subsequent remedial measures area, including
the initial question of whether the federal rule should govern in diversity
actions.. Section II looks at the Senate's attempts to bring products liabil-
ity substantive and evidentiary law under federal control. This section
then urges Congress to incorporate a clear statement of its intent regard-
ing admissibility of remedial measures into any products liability legisla-
tion it passes. Finally, section III proposes that a rule 403-type balancing
4. Compare, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th
Cir. 1980) ("Employing Rule 407 to exclude evidence ... that is relevant and not prejudicial,
as determined under Rules 401 and 403, would thwart the policies that underlie strict liability
by an illogical imposition of a negligence-based rule of evidence."), cert. denied sub nom. Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984) with Flaminio, 733 F.2d at
469 (the policy rationale of encouraging remedial measures applies "whether the basis of liabil-
ity is the defendant's own negligence or his product's defectiveness or inherent dangerous-
ness"). Many courts apply the federal rule without any Erie analysis; they simply state that
the federal evidence rules govern the admissibility of evidence, "[e]ven in diversity cases,"
Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1979), or
apply the rules without any hint that there might be an issue. See, e.g., Unterburger v. Snow
Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980).
5. See S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 310(b), 132 CONG. REC. 11,745 (1986); S. 100,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13, 131 CONG. REC. 194 (1985); S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1984);
S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14, 129 CONG REC. 90 (1983); S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14,
128 CONG. REC. 13,773 (1982); infra notes 118-52 and accompanying text. The current ver-
sions of the bill, S. 666, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2823 (1987) and S. 687, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2857 (1987), contain no such provision regarding remedial
measures evidence.




test is the appropriate standard for Congress to adopt and, in the absence
of congressional action, for the federal courts to apply. 7 Such a rule
would allow judges the discretion to admit relevant remedial measures
evidence where justice dictates, while still allowing exclusion of such evi-
dence where public policy is more compelling.
I. Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict
Liability Cases
A. The Scope of Rule 407
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is not admissible to prove "negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event." 8 The exclusion of this admittedly
relevant evidence9 is justified by a public policy of encouraging-or not
discouraging-the making of repairs.' 0
Rule 407 expressly excludes only evidence offered to prove "negli-
gence or culpable conduct."1 Both of these terms contain notions of
fault. In the case of negligent conduct, a person has failed "to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar
circumstances"; 12 and her act or omission has caused harm to another.
Similarly, culpable conduct involves "the breach of a legal duty or the
commission of a fault."1 3 In addition, it "normally involves something
more than simple negligence and implies conduct which is 'blamable [or]
7. See FED. R. EVID. 403 and advisory committee's note; infra notes 153-63 and accom-
panying text.
8. FED. R. EvID. 407. See supra note 1 for the full text of the rule.
9. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note (the evidence is relevant since it
supports an inference that the party was at fault).
10. Id. The Committee notes as a further rationale that taking remedial action is not an
admission of fault, the apparent implication being that the fact finder might feel bound to
regard such evidence as an admission. Id. However, the Committee also recognizes that this
would not be a sufficient basis to exclude evidence. Id. Since evidence is relevant if it merely
has "any tendency" to make the existence of a fact more or less probable, FED. R. EVID. 401,
much evidence that alone could not support a conclusion that the party had admitted fault
would nevertheless be relevant to the issue of liability. According to the Committee, the social
policy rationale is the "more impressive" one. Id See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE-COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS 407-10, 407-11 & 407-12 (1986):
Rule 407 has only a marginal justification. Its underlying assumption is that a per-
son will not take remedial measures because his corrective actions might be used in
evidence in a future trial. Such an assumption seems absurd.... The weakness of
the rule's rationale explains why a number of courts hold that the policy of encourag-
ing safety provisions does not apply to actions based on strict liability ....
Id. at 407-12.
11. FED. R. EVID. 407 and advisory committee's note.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (5th ed., abridged, 1983).
13. Id. at 200.
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censurable' .. . .14 Thus, rule 407 explicitly applies only to cases in
which some degree of fault or wrongdoing is at issue.
In contrast to its express application to claims based on negligence
or culpable conduct, rule 407 does not expressly apply to strict liability
claims. A strict liability cause of action has no element of fault,' 5 unlike
negligence and culpable conduct causes of action. In fact, a defendant
can be held liable under strict liability even if he "has exercised all possi-
ble care in the preparation and sale of his product." 16 Thus, the express
provisions of rule 407 pertaining to negligence and culpable conduct do
not govern strict liability. The question remains whether the rule implic-
itly applies to strict liability causes of action. Before that question can be
answered, however, courts must determine whether federal law may be
consulted in the issue of admissibility of remedial measures evidence.
B. Federal Rule or State Rule
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction of strict liability ac-
tions in diversity suits or in the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over
nonfederal claims. In these cases, the threshold question for a court's
rule 407 analysis is whether federal law may control at all. When state
law provides the rule of decision, the Erie doctrine, expounded in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 1 7 limits the application of federal law to proce-
dural matters and requires that substantive issues be left to state law.
Distinguishing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from federal com-
mon law, Hanna v. Plumer refined the Erie doctrine by authorizing the
use of a federal rule that is on point if the matter in question is arguably
procedural. ' 8
14. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (4th ed., 1968)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); see also Madden, supra note
2, at 12 n.47 (quoting but not crediting the Werner passage).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which defines strict liability,
states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
16. Id.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The term "Erie doctrine" embodies a family of cases that defines
when a federal court must apply state law in a diversity action. For discussion of the applica-
tion of the Erie doctrine in strict liability cases, see Note, supra note 3.
18. 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965).
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The notion expressed in Erie-that the power to create substantive
law rests in the states, except where Congress has exercised an existing
power to provide a rule of decision-is an important consideration in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, where the rules of evidence
contain substantive or policy elements, the drafters often indicated that
state law should control. Most notably, the rules covering privilege and
general competency in civil actions explicitly call for deference to state
law when state law provides the rule of decision. 19 In contrast, rule 407
has no such qualifying instruction despite its express purpose to foster a
particular substantive policy-encouraging remedial measures.
20
As a result, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have
taken two divergent analytical paths in deciding whether to apply rule
407 in diversity cases. The first line of reasoning is based on objections to
rule 407's substantive content. During the hearings in the House of Rep-
resentatives, Professor Victor E. Schwartz objected to rule 407 because it
purported to govern evidence whose admissibility should be decided
under state rules:
[T]he rule is not based on relevance, but on the goal of encouraging (or
at least not discouraging) defendants from making repairs after an ac-
cident has occurred .... [W]hether the evidence is excluded or not
should be a matter of state policy where state law governs-[as it
should be] with any rule whose purpose is not finding truth or expedit-
ing a trial, but rather promoting some other value and excluding evi-
dence on that basis.
2 1
Thus, according to Professor Schwartz, since the main thrust of rule
407 is thepolicy of encouraging certain activity, state law should provide
the rule in the remedial measures area. Following this line of reasoning,
the Tenth Circuit, in Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation,
held that state law governs the admissibility of remedial measures evi-
dence if it provides the rule of substantive law.22 In that case, the plain-
tiffs brought suit under negligence and strict products liability theories
for damages incurred in a plane crash.23 After a verdict in favor of the
defendants on all counts, the plaintiffs appealed the exclusion of a
"newsflash," published by the defendant, that demonstrated "the need
for a warning regarding the insidious danger presented by the autopilot
19. FED. R. EvID. 501 (privilege); 601 (competency).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
21. Hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1973) (state-
ment of Professor Victor E. Schwartz); see WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, at 407-21
("In diversity cases, Erie concerns should require that these [state products liability statutes
containing subsequent repairs exclusionary rules] be given effect because of their largely sub-
stantive content."); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 920.
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in the Falcon 10 [airplane]." '24 The appellate court observed that "[t]he
purpose of rule 407 is not to seek the truth or to expedite trial proceed-
ings; rather, in our view, it is one designed to promote state policy in a
substantive law area."' 25 In addition, the court noted the close relation-
ship between a state's products liability law and its rules regarding reme-
dial measures evidence in such cases and stated that the state rule must
control "in order to effect uniformity and to prevent forum shopping.
26
Thus, those who argue that state rules for the admissibility of reme-
dial measures evidence should control emphasize the distinction Erie
drew between substantive and procedural rules. They argue that exclud-
ing remedial measures evidence has public policy and social engineering
purposes, rather than the efficiency and accuracy goals typically found in
procedural rules.
The other circuits that have addressed the issue have not been per-
suaded by either Professor Schwartz' argument or the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning. Rather, if they discuss the issue at all,27 they seem to empha-
size the procedural elements of the rules. These courts have found that
the federal rule applies regardless of the source of decisional law. For
example, the Seventh Circuit, in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., acknowl-
edged that since rule 407 was based on a policy to encourage remedial
measures, an argument could be made that Erie would require the appli-
cation of state law in this area.28 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that
the substantive aspects of rule 407 are "entwined with procedural consid-
erations" 29 and ultimately applied the federal rule, even though Wiscon-
sin law provided the substantive rule of decision:
Congress's judgment that juries are apt to give too much weight to
24. Id. at 930.
25. Id. at 932.
26. Id.
27. Some courts simply state without discussion that rule 407 applies to strict liability
claims. For example, in Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885
(5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit declared that "[iun matters of procedure ... such as the
admissibility of evidence, federal rules apply." See also Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240,
244-45 (1st Cir. 1985) (federal rules are generally procedural and therefore applicable in diver-
sity actions unless the rule of evidence is truly substantive, such as in rules regarding collateral
sources, parole evidence, and statute of frauds); Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron
Works, 604 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Even in diversity cases, the Federal Rules of
Evidence generally govern the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts"). Indeed, the
majority of the circuits have not given the matter even this much attention; rather, they as-
sume that the federal rule applies and only discuss the application of the particular rule to the
particular case. See, e.g., Gauthier v. A.M.F., Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1986); R.W.
Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 274 (8th Cir. 1985); Hall v. American
S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990 (3d
Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
28. 733 F.2d 463, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 471.
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such [remedial measures] evidence is a procedural judgment... that is,
a judgment concerning procedures designed to enhance accuracy or
reduce expense in the adjudicative process. It is therefore well within
the power of Congress to make for the federal courts with respect to
any class of cases within their jurisdiction.
30
The Flaminio court thus used the Erie-Hanna doctrine to justify ap-
plying rule 407 because the rule has some procedural purposes. The
court, however, omitted a critical step in its analysis. A proper Erie-
Hanna analysis requires two steps. A court must first determine whether
a federal rule is on point. If so, and if it is arguably procedural, the rule
governs. If not, a court must ask whether application of federal common
law will lead to forum shopping or result in different outcomes between
cases tried in state court and cases tried in federal court. An affirmative
answer would render the matter substantive and thus governed by state
law.3
1
The lenient "arguably procedural" standard only applies to enacted
rules that are on point.32 The Flaminio court did not even address this
question and assumed that rule 407 was on point. It is questionable,
however, whether rule 407 qualifies, since it explicitly covers only the
exclusion of evidence to prove the elements of claims asserting negligent
or culpable conduct; that is, its scope may not be "as broad as [its propo-
nents have] urged ... .- 33 Congress did not refer to strict liability claims
when it excluded remedial measures evidence. The courts have spent
years disagreeing whether the rule should be extended to strict liability
actions.34 Thus, it would seem that this rule is not on point, since a rule
that is already on point need not be extended by the courts.
When there is no enacted federal rule on point-that is, when fed-
eral common law would be applied-the federal rule of law must pass a
stricter test than the "arguably procedural" standard for enacted rules on
point; it must satisfy Erie.35 A court must examine the implications of
applying a federal common-law rule and balance the federal policy
against the competing interests of preferring state substantive law, en-
couraging uniformity between federal and state courts, and not encourag-
30. Id.
31. See, eg., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("The nub of the
policy that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of
a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away
should not lead to a substantially different result."); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
467 (1965) ("The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the
character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a
federal court.... The decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of'forum-shopping'
32. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 470. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
34. Cf infra text accompanying notes 38-65.
35. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
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ing forum shopping.3 6
The traditional type of forum shopping, in which plaintiffs try to
choose the more favorable federal forum, is not very likely to occur here,
since the majority rule in the federal courts is not favorable to plaintiffs.
Manipulation of forum options, however, can occur. For example, plain-
tiffs may seek to file in particular state courts, such as the defendant's
location, to prevent removal to a federal court.37 In addition, plaintiffs
may seek to file in those federal circuits where the rule is more favorable.
On the other hand, defendants are strongly motivated in most cases to
have the case removed to federal court, where remedial measures evi-
dence would usually be excluded.
Finally, different results are frequently reached depending upon the
particular trial court, both between federal and state courts and among
federal circuits. This forum shopping results in inefficient use of judicial
resources and inequitable results from case to case and is precisely the
evil Erie sought to avoid. Since rule 407 is not an enacted rule on point
with respect to strict product liability; and since applying rule 407 both
encourages forum shopping and affects outcomes, that rule should not be
applied where state law provides the rule of decision.
Because the federal courts differ among themselves, however, this is
not merely an Erie problem. Unless Congress or the Supreme Court spe-
cifically addresses the question whether remedial measures evidence
should be excluded in strict liability actions, the foregoing problems will
still exist, even if a federal products law preempts state law, eliminating
the Erie problem. For the conflict among the circuits would continue-
no longer over whether to apply federal or state rules, now over whether
to apply the federal rule to strict liability actions.
C. Applying Rule 407 to Strict Liability Actions
(1) Two Circuits Do Not Apply Rule
Once a court has determined that rule 407 is procedural and gener-
ally applicable, it must decide whether rule 407 applies to strict products
liability cases in particular. Both the Eighth and the Tenth Circuits have
held that rule 407 does not apply to strict product liability cases.38 R. W.
Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp. 39 was an express warranty prod-
36. See id. at 467-68; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (where subject matter jurisdiction is not based on a
federal question, the case "shall be removable only if none of the ... defendants is a citizen of
the state in which such action is brought").
38. See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 274 (8th Cir.
1985); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1326-31 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984). But
see De Luryea v. Winthrop Labs, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983).
39. 758 F.2d at 268-69, 274.
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ucts liability action in which the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence
that the manufacturer changed the manufacturing materials and meth-
ods after the plaintiff purchased glass that accumulated moisture between
the panes. Since no negligent or culpable conduct had to be shown, the
Eighth Circuit found the breach of warranty action to be analogous to a
strict liability action and held that "Rule 407 does not bar the admission
of subsequent remedial measures evidence in actions based on strict lia-
bility 'since Rule 407 is, by its terms, confined to cases involving negli-
gence or other culpable conduct.'-4o The court suggested that the
appropriate way to fight admission of remedial measures in strict liability
actions would be to question the relevance of the evidence. 41
In another case, Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Associa-
tion, the Eighth Circuit held that evidence of a subsequent warning that a
cattle feed supplement could be dangerous was admissible in a strict lia-
bility action.42 The decision endorsed the California Supreme Court's
reasoning in Ault v. International Harvester Co.43 The Ault court held
that while the exclusion of remedial measures evidence "may fulfill [an]
anti-deterrent function in the typical negligence action, the provision
plays no comparable role in the products liability field." 44 The California
court did not believe that a mass producer's design decisions would be
influenced by whether or not any design changes would then be admissi-
ble at trial:
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence setting
to the modem products liability field... the "public policy" assump-
tions justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer valid. The contem-
porary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal products liability
defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of goods; it is man-
ifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego making
improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits
and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because
evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an ac-
tion founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded
the improvement. In the products liability area, the exclusionary rule
of section 1151 [the California evidentiary rule corresponding to rule
407] does not affect the primary conduct of the mass producer of
40. Id. at 274 (citations omitted); see also Unterburger v. Snow Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 599,
603 (8th Cir. 1980) ("FED. R. EvID. 407 does not apply to actions based on strict liability;
hence this evidence [of remedial measures] was admissible under the strict liability count.");
Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Rule 407 does not apply to actions
based on strict liability .... "); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Rule 407 is, by its terms, confined to cases involving negligence or
other culpable conduct. The doctrine of strict liability by its very nature, does not include
these elements.").
41. Murray, 758 F.2d at 274.
42. 552 F.2d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1977).
43. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
44. Id. at 119, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
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goods, but serves merely as a shield against potential liability. 45
The Tenth Circuit has also found that rule 407 does not apply to
strict liability actions. In Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., the
representatives of two airplane crash victims brought a strict liability ac-
tion against the manufacturer of the plane, Piper Aircraft. 46 The plain-
tiffs had offered as evidence a service bulletin issued by Piper describing a
modification that owners should make to a spring. 47 The court reviewed
the decisions of other courts and decided that rule 407 should be nar-
rowly construed:
[W]here there is any reason for use of the evidence other than to estab-
lish the defendant's negligence, Rule 407 should not apply. The reason
that has been recognized is that Rule 407 excludes only evidence which
is used to prove defendant's negligence or culpable conduct; its appli-
cability in strict liability cases is not expressly provided for and has
been rejected.
48
The Herndon court found exclusion of such evidence inappropriate
in strict liability actions, since in such cases "society chooses to place
responsibility for the potential losses from producing an unsafe airplane
with the manufacturer, regardless of the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's design decisions."'49 Barring remedial measures evidence would
"thwart the policies that underlie strict liability." 50
The court rejected the notion that rule 407 should apply to strict
liability cases in order to encourage "tort feasors to take steps to remedy
a -hazardous condition in their control."5 1 It also questioned whether
admitting such evidence would in fact discourage manufacturers from
taking remedial action.5 2 First, the court noted that insurers would be
unlikely to allow manufacturers to continue operating without taking re-
medial measures. 53 Second, governmental agencies and juries deliberat-
ing on punitive damages would be "unlikely to approve of such callous
behavior."' 54 In fact, manufacturers might even be encouraged to take
remedial measures anyway, since such measures might show good will to
a punitive damages jury. Third, there was no empirical evidence that the
admissibility of such evidence affects manufacturers' behavior at all.55
Finally, the court considered the second rationale for rule 407, rele-
45. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
46. 716 F.2d 1322, 1326-31 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp.
v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1331.
49. Id. at 1327.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1327-28.





vancy.56 That rationale states that the mere fact remedial measures were
taken does not constitute an admission, "since the conduct is equally
consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negli-
gence."' 57 Because the evidence could reasonably be construed an admis-
sion of some fault, however, "this ground alone would not support
exclusion."58 The general rules of relevancy set forth in rules 401 and
403 must therefore be consulted.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."' 59 Rule 403 provides a balancing test which allows
evidence to be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."' 60 The Herndon court found that
the evidence would be relevant under rule 401, but noted that rule 403's
balancing test would still have to be satisfied before the evidence could be
admitted.
61
In sum, the courts addressed three issues in examining whether rule
407 applies to strict liability cases. First, must the rule be applied. The
answer to that is clear. Since conduct for which one is strictly liable need
not be negligent or culpable, the rule's terms do not mandate its applica-
tion in strict liability actions.
Second, would and should the policy behind the rule be advanced by
applying it to similar situations not expressly covered by the rule. The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have answered this question with a negative.
The Robbins, Ault, and Herndon courts all questioned whether applying
the exclusionary rule would even have an effect on manufacturers. 62 In
addition, the Herndon court was concerned that applying this evidentiary
rule would, in effect, preempt the substantive policy of strict liability,
which is to hold the manufacturer responsible for unsafe products re-
gardless of fault.63
Finally, the courts suggest that the ultimate question in considering
subsequent remedial measures evidence is relevance. The Murray court
hinted that the relevance of such evidence was questionable in strict lia-
bility actions, where the inquiry is the reasonableness of the product's
56. See supra notes 9-10.
57. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
58. Id.
59. FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
60. FED. R. EvID. 403.
61. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1329.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 45 & 52-55.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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unsafe condition.64 The Herndon court was more explicit in noting that
such evidence would still have to be more probative than prejudicial
under a rule 403 analysis. 65
(2) Most Circuits Apply Rule 407 in Strict Liability Cases
Despite the Eighth and Tenth Circuits' positions, the majority of the
circuits have held that rule 407 requires the exclusion of remedial meas-
ures evidence in strict liability actions.66 The First and Third Circuits
have excluded such evidence under rule 407 with little or no discussion. 67
Other circuits have addressed the problem more fully. For example, the
Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn Co. focused on the policy reasons
behind rule 407 and the effect that the admission of remedial measures
evidence would have on manufacturers under both negligence and strict
liability theories.6 The plaintiff had sought to introduce evidence that
the defendant, a pharmaceuticals producer, had published a subsequent
warning that one of its drugs had dangerous side effects. 69 The trial
court had admitted the evidence in the negligence and strict liability ac-
tions for the purpose of proving the feasibility of an adequate warning. 70
The trial court, however, also had allowed the plaintiff to use that evi-
dence to argue negligence.7' In remanding the case for a new trial, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the common-law rule-the model for the fed-
eral rule-should be consulted on the issue whether remedial measures
should be admitted in strict liability actions:
The rule simply does not speak in terms to the question of whether the
evidence should come in to prove strict liability. To resolve this ques-
tion we must [ask] ... would the policy behind the common law rule
be served or subverted if evidence of subsequent precautionary meas-
ures be admitted to prove strict liability.
72
The court based its decision to exclude on the policy of not discour-
aging remedial measures, a policy that is desirable regardless of the the-
64. Murray, 758 F.2d at 274.
65. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1329.
66. See, e.g., Gauthier v. A.M.F., Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama
Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062,
1067 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v.
Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
67. See Josephs, 677 F.2d at 991; Roy, 584 F.2d at 1134.
68. 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The court
emphasized that the plaintiff had actually used the remedial measures evidence to argue the
negligence aspect of his claim. Id. at 853.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 854.
72. Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
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ory under which a subsequent lawsuit is brought.73 In addition, it
pointed out that Congress and the common law had excluded remedial
measures evidence where the defendant was actually blameworthy for his
conduct 74 and suggested that an innocent defendant should receive at
least the same evidentiary protections as one who had done a wrong.
75
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Hall v. American Steamship Co. ap-
plied rule 407 to a strict liability action.76 In this unseaworthiness case,
the defendant objected to the admission of evidence that its policy had
changed such that decks would no longer be hosed down during bad
weather.77 In finding that rule 407 applied, the court held that "culpable
conduct" included any conduct "that would impose liability" upon the
defendant.78 The court also cited Werner with approval, and found that,
regardless of the definition of "culpable conduct," the subsequent reme-
dial measures would be excluded at least for the policy reasons underly-
ing rule 407.79
The Seventh Circuit joined the First through Sixth Circuits in ex-
cluding evidence of remedial measures in strict products liability ac-
tions. 0 In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., two blueprints showing
subsequent design changes in a Honda motorcycle's struts had been of-
fered to show that precautions against "wobble" were feasible. 81 The
court rejected the argument that a manufacturer would take remedial
action, without regard for the admissibility of that action in a lawsuit,
simply because not taking action would be "not only immoral but reck-
less."'82 Rather, the court pointed out that:
[A]ccidents are low-probability events. The probability of another ac-
cident may be much smaller than the probability that the victim of the
accident that has already occurred will sue the injurer and, if permit-
ted, will make devastating use at trial of any measures that the injurer
may have taken since the accident to reduce the danger.
83
The Flaminio court recognized that defendants in strict liability
might not have any incentive to take remedial action anyway, by virtue
73. Id. at 857; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
74. Werner, 628 F.2d at 856-57.
75. Id. at 857; see also Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability, supra note
2, at 929.
76. 688 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1982).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1066-67.
80. See, eg., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Oberst v.
International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980) (not reversible error to exclude
subsequent repairs). See infra notes 91-100, for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's treatment of
the issue, and infra text accompanying notes 101-09 for a discussion of the Second Circuit's
analysis.
81. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id.
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of the fact that the liability is strict.84 This fact would not, however,
make it desirable to remove strict liability actions from the scope of rule
407.85 Rather, "[i]n those cases where the defendant would have no in-
centive to take remedial measures anyway, because the accident was una-
voidable, rule 407 is academic; there will be, by assumption, no
subsequent remedial measures."' 86 The assertion that "unavoidable" ac-
cidents do not inspire efforts to avoid future accidents is debatable at
best. More importantly, however, this statement is misleading because it
imputes motive to the term, "remedial measure." The definition given in
the rule, however, is an objective one; that is, a measure is remedial if, in
fact, it would have made the event less likely to occur.87 It is irrelevant
why the measure was taken.
The Ninth Circuit has most recently addressed the issue of admissi-
bility of remedial measures evidence in strict liability cases. In Gauthier
v. A.MF., Inc.,88 the court followed the reasoning of Flaminio in finding
that evidence of a design change made in a snow thrower between 1971
and 1984 was inadmissible under rule 407. The court stated that there
was no difference between strict liability and negligence where the public
policy of encouraging remedial measure was concerned. 89 Furthermore,
the court took issue with the Ault court's contention that large manufac-
turers would not avoid improving their products: "[I]t is precisely the
large manufacturers who are defendants in many product liability suits
who are most likely to know about rule 407 and be affected by the deci-
sion whether to apply it." 9°
The Fifth Circuit in Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxy-
gen Co., also held that rule 407 applies to exclude remedial measures
evidence in strict liability cases, 91 but rested its decision on a rule 403-
type balancing analysis 92 more than on the rule 407 policy analysis em-
phasized in the other circuits. In this case arising out of a fire allegedly
caused by defendant manufacturer's gas cylinder valve, the plaintiff had
offered evidence of a "differently designed model" of the valve later man-
ufactured by the defendant.93 First, the court observed that the policy of
encouraging change to improve products and make them safer was im-
84. Id. at 469-70.
85. Id. at 470.
86. Id.
87. See FED. R. EVID. 407. The rule excludes evidence of acts which "would have made
the event less likely to occur." Id. There is no mention of motivation or purpose behind the
action.
88. 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 637.
90. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
91. 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied. 699 F.2d 1163 (1983).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 61 & 101-09.
93. Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 885.
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portant.94 It ignored, however, the lack of proof that exclusion actually
encouraged such change, stating that "the assumption in the rule that
[admitting remedial measures evidence] might have a deterrent effect is
not demonstrably inapplicable [in strict liability actions]." 95 The court
went on to say that its decision "rest[ed] more firmly on the proposition
that evidence of subsequent repair or change has little relevance to
whether the product in question was defective at some previous time"
96
and was seemingly reluctant to speculate about the effect of evidentiary
rules on industry practice or why a design change was or was not made.
97
Thus, instead of basing its decision on the policy rationale, the court
based its decision on the confusion which could result if the jury were
given evidence of events taking place after the product was alleged defec-
tive.98 In effect, the court, while nominally resting its decision on rule
407,9 9 actually applied the rule 403 balancing test, which requires "the
exclusion of relevant information if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of confusion."' 1
The Second Circuit has also alluded to rule 403-type considerations
in its application of rule 407 to strict liability cases. In Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., the court described its process in determining whether trans-
mission design modifications and Owner's Manual changes made after an
automobile accident were admissible.101 First, the court stated that rule
403 "requires the court to consider whether the probative value of the
evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confu-
sion."102 Next, rule 407's exclusion of "post-remedial measures 'to prove
negligence or culpable conduct'" must be addressed.103 Rejecting the
argument that rule 407 does not apply in strict liability actions "because
such actions do not involve 'negligence or culpable conduct,' ,o4 the
court stated that "[t]he failure of rule 407 to refer explicitly to actions in
strict liability does not prevent its application to such actions."' 10 5 The
Cann court stated that Congress had intended the gaps in the rules to be
94. Id. at 887.
95. Id.
96. Id. While surely there are cases in which such evidence would be only slightly rele-
vant, it also seems likely that there are cases in which such evidence would support a stronger
inference that a defect existed at an earlier time. In both cases, the evidence would be admissi-
ble under rule 401. On the other hand, rule 403 is designed to distinguish between the two
situations and would probably require exclusion in the former case.
97. Id. at 887-88.
98. Id. at 888.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 59-60.
105. Id. at 60.
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filled in by judges, using "common-law principles"10 6 and held that re-
medial measures evidence should be excluded because it was "common
sense" that a party would not act in a way that would "increase the risk
of losing a lawsuit." 10 7 According to the court, the policy underlying the
rule was equally applicable to strict liability and negligence:
The application of those [common-law] principles convinces us that
although negligence and strict products liability causes of action are
distinguishable, no distinction between the two justifies the admission
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability
actions.
... [While] a negligence action places in issue whether the defend-
ant's conduct was reasonable [and] a strict liability action involves
whether the product was defective ...the defendant must pay the
judgment in both situations .... [T]he policy underlying Rule 407 not
to discourage persons from taking remedial measures is relevant to de-
fendants sued under either theory .... lO8
The court concluded its opinion by stating, "Furthermore, as hap-
pened here, plaintiffs frequently bring actions sounding in both negli-
gence and strict liability. In sum, we hold that Rule 407 applies to strict
liability actions."' 0 9 Presumably, the court was referring to the extra
danger of jury confusion when evidence is admissible for one cause of
action, but would be inadmissible if the second cause of action were
brought alone. This type of issue is commonly found in rule 403 balanc-
ing analysis.
D. Summary of Circuit Conflict
The debate whether to apply rule 407 in strict liability actions fo-
cuses on three questions. First, what is the rule's intended scope. Sec-
ond, to what extent would applying the rule to strict liability actions
effectuate the policy goals of rule 407. Third, how should the issue of the
evidence's relevance, or irrelevance, affect the decision to admit or ex-
clude the evidence.
The first question is one of construction. Those circuits that would
admit remedial measures evidence have found that rule 407 is confined
by its terms to actions involving negligence or culpable conduct." 0
Thus, since strict liability by definition has no element of culpability or
negligence, the rule cannot apply to exclude evidence. In contrast, the
circuits that would exclude such evidence generally focus on the rule's
policy rationale of encouraging remedial measures and dismiss the argu-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
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ment that strict liability actions are not within the rule.11 '
Courts also ask how effective excluding remedial measures evidence
would be in furthering rule 407's policy goal of encouraging manufactur-
ers to take such measures. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits generally
question whether the existence or nonexistence of the rule has any effect
on behavior.11 2 On the other hand, courts which exclude the evidence
under rule 407 either assume that the application of the rule would affect
behavior, 13 or defer to Congress by permitting the application of the rule
since it is conceivable that it would-affect behavior.
114
In addition, one court has ruled that the policy of holding product
manufacturers strictly liable for unsafe products should be balanced
against the rule 407 policy not to discourage remedial measures. That
court held that the strict liability policy outweighs the rule 407 policy.11
5
Finally, courts have discussed the relevance of remedial measures
evidence. Whether or not they agree on the application of rule 407, the
circuits generally agree that rule 403's "probative value versus unfair
prejudice" balancing test must be passed before any evidence is admissi-
ble.'1 6 Some courts have explicitly rested their decisions on considera-
tions, such as jury confusion and probative value, that are traditionally
associated with rule 403 analysis.1
17
The inability of the Courts of Appeals to reach consensus on the
treatment of rule 407 has created uncertainty for litigants, for businesses,
and for individuals. In addition, parties are treated differently depending
on which circuit hears their case. The situation cries out for Congress to
take responsibility and resolve the question. So far, the issue has been
addressed only incidentally.
II. Senate Attempts to Bring Products Liability Under Federal
Control
For several years, some members of Congress have pushed to pass a
bill preempting state substantive law in the products liability area. 118
Many of these bills have also attempted to unify the standards admitting
subsequent remedial measures evidence. 119 The bills introduced in the
Senate since 1982 have addressed this issue in three ways: by strictly
11I. See supra notes 66-109 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 & 52-55.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
114. See supra text accompanying note 95.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61, 91-100 & 102.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 91-109.
118. See, e.g., S. 687, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2837 (1987); S. 2631, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 13,773 (1982).
119. See, e.g., S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 310(b), 132 CONG. REC. 11,745 (1986); S.
2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14, 128 CONG. REC. 13,773 (1982).
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excluding remedial measures evidence; by adopting a rule parallel to rule
407; or by ignoring the problem.120 From 1982 through 1985, the bills
provided that remedial measures evidence was inadmissible, with a single
exception allowing use of such evidence "to impeach a witness for the
manufacturer or product seller who has expressly denied the feasibility of
such a measure."1 21 According to the Committee Report on Senate Bill
44, the purpose of this strict provision was to "preserve[ ] the incentive
for manufacturers and product sellers to improve their products." 122 An
additional rationale is that:
this evidence is -not relevant to the issue of liability, because liability
should be judged at the time the event occurred rather than at a subse-
quent point in time. Evidence of a subsequent measure, if admitted,
may lead a jury to infer wrongful conduct from the fact that a remedial
measure was taken after the event occurred.
t23
This provision would also "avoid[ ] the issue raised in the cases that
distinguish strict liability actions from negligence-based actions when ap-
plying" rule 407.124 The Report endorses the majority rule in the federal
courts that "negligent or culpable conduct" actually refers to conduct
that would result in liability in general. 125 "The policy for excluding sub-
sequent remedial measures-to encourage safety-should apply uni-
formly in all product liability actions." 1
26
120. See, e.g., S. 687, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2857 (1987) (no remedial
measures clause); S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 310(b), 132 CONG. REC. 11,745 (1986) (reme-
dial measures inadmissible to prove liability; exceptions parallel rule 407); S. 100, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 13, 131 CONG. REC. 194 (1985) (remedial measures inadmissible unless to impeach
manufacturer's witness who has explicitly feasibility of such measures).
121. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14, 128 CONG. REC. 13,773 (1982); S. 44, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 14, 129 CONG. REC. 90 (1983); S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13, 131 CONG. REC.
194 (1984); S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13, 131 CONG. REC. 194 (1985) [hereinafter cited
collectively as Strict Exclusion Bills]. The section on remedial measures is identical in each bill
and reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), evidence of any measure taken after an
event, which if taken previously would have made the event less likely to occur, is not
admissible.
(b) This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of a subsequent mea-
sure in an action alleging a product was unreasonably dangerous in design or formu-
lation, if offered to impeach a witness for the manufacturer or product seller who has
expressly denied the feasibility of such a measure.
Id.
These bills, as well as the later bills, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302, 132 CONG. REC.
11,745 (1986) and S. 687, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 302, 133 CONG. REC. 2857 (1987), do
provide for admission of remedial measures during the punitive damages phase of a trial. E.g.,
S. 44, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 13(b) (2), 129 CONG. REC. 90 (1983).
122. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
123. Id. at 62.




This strict exclusionary rule has been criticized on several fronts.
Senator Hollings argued that admitting remedial measures evidence
would not discourage such action by manufacturers since by taking such
measures they could avoid future lawsuits-and by not taking them they
would expose themselves to future liability and punitive damages.127 In
addition, it has been pointed out that "manufacturers themselves admit
that 'if a design change needs to be made, we make it.' 1,28
Critics also take issue with the argument that remedial measures
evidence is not relevant. According to Senator Hollings, "[s]uch evi-
dence is relevant, for the manufacturer would not have made the subse-
quent improvement unless the improvement would make its product
safer."' 129 The evidence is logically and legally relevant, since it is prob-
able that the product was less safe before the change. Indeed, the term
"remedial measures" refers to action that remedies a less safe situa-
tion. 130 Thus, a more accurate formulation of the problem would state
that the evidence of remedial measures is not sufficiently relevant.. Since
such evidence is relevant according to the rule 401 definition-which
only requires that evidence be capable of supporting an inference that the
product was not safe' 3 1-it is more instructive to characterize the issue in
terms of balancing the evidence's value against the risks inherent in its
use.
The rule proposed in these "Strict Exclusion Bills" would narrow
the range of evidence admissible under even a broad interpretation of
rule 407. It does away with limited admissibility of remedial measures
evidence by not allowing such evidence to be considered for proof of any
fact. 132 It only allows remedial measures into evidence for the single pur-
pose of impeaching a manufacturer's witness, and even then only if the
witness "has expressly denied the feasibility" 133 of the remedial measure
in question. 134 Since the only allowable purpose is impeachment, the
jury would have to be instructed that the evidence could only be consid-
ered as bearing on the witness' credibility and not for its truth. Thus
ownership, control, and feasibility could never be proven by remedial
measures under this rule, whereas rule 407 would permit such evidence if
these issues were controverted. 135
127. Id. at 102.
128. Product Liability Act: Hearings on S. 100 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 94 (1985)
(appendix to statement of Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of
America) (quoting Ivan Brand, Vermeer Corp.) [hereinafter Product Liability Act Hearings].
129. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess 102 (1984).
130. See id.; Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 128, at 94.
131. See supra notes 9-10 & 59.
132. Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 128, at 94.
133. E.g., S. 2631, 97th ong., 2d Sess. § 14(b), 128 CONG. REc. 13,773 (1982).
134. Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 128, at 94.
135. See id.
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Finally, the proposed rule would clearly favor defendants in strict
product liability actions. According to Senator Hollings, "the defendant
would essentially determine if evidence of subsequent repairs would be
admitted in product liability cases."' 136 Senator Hollings, in arguing
against the strict exclusion of remedial measures evidence, noted:
One tort law professor concludes that the [proposed] treatment of
the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures . . . represents a
"lowest common denominator approach." He recognizes that the law
is in some disagreement but notes that [the bill] "summarily opted for
a rule which provides the greatest measure of safety for
defendants."'
137
The rule favors the defendant by restricting the admissibility of remedial
measures when the claimant would want to offer it, and allowing the
admission of such evidence when it helps the defendant, such as when the
defendant offers the evidence against a punitive damages claim.
138
Some of these concerns were apparently taken to heart, for the suc-
cessor to the 1985 bill, Senate Bill 2760, revised the subsequent remedial
measures section to essentially mirror rule 407.139 The main rationale
cited is still the policy of preserving "the incentive for manufacturers and
product sellers to improve their products."'' 14 The committee also stated
that by admitting damaging evidence, it would unfairly penalize manu-
facturers who improve their products, thereby placing the manufacturer
"who fails to improve its product in a better position at trial than the
manufacturer ... who improves its product."'1'4
While the incentive and fairness issues were important, the major
emphasis in the discussion of the rule was on balancing the probative
value of such evidence against the risk of jury confusion. 42 The commit-
tee was most concerned with the timing of the remedial measures and
worried
that the jury [would] focus on later events, rather than on the relevant
knowledge of the manufacturer at the time of production. Evidence of
a subsequent product improvement, if admitted, may lead a jury to
136. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1984).
137. Id. (quoting Professor Andrew F. Popper, Washington College of Law).
138. Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 128, at 94-95.
139. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 310(b), 132 CONG. REC. 11,745 (1986). The section
states:
(b) Evidence of measures taken after an event, which if taken previously would
have made the event less likely to occur, is not admissible to lrove liability in any
action subject to this title, in connection with the event. This section does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if con-
troverted, or impeachment.
Id. (emphasis added to highlight substantive difference between § 310(b) and rule 407).
140. S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986); see id. at 75-76.
141. Id. at 76.
142. Id. at 75-76.
[Vol. 39THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
REMEDIAL MEASURES EVIDENCE
infer that the changes would not have been made if the product was
reasonably safe or had adequate warning at the time of
manufacture. 143
It is interesting that the committee was concerned about the "relevant
knowledge of the manufacturer," a factor that is not at issue in a strict
liability action.144 In such actions, the manufacturer need not be aware
of the defect, and the defect need not be correctable. 145 Rather, in cases
of strict liability, society has determined that holding the manufacturer
financially responsible for injuries caused by the product is the most ap-
propriate way of spreading the cost of unsafe but useful products among
the beneficiaries of those products.146
Finally, the committee noted that remedial measures evidence that
would be technically admissible under the rule should not be admitted "if
other evidence regarding these matters is reasonably available,"' 147 a con-
sideration common in rule 403 analysis. Thus, the committee based its
recommendation of this section largely on the rule 403-type balancing
considerations of jury confusion and the need for the evidence. 148
The latest bills, Senate Bills 666 and 687, contain no provision re-
garding remedial measures evidence. 149 If passed, the current bills would
govern strict products liability cases with a uniform, federal substantive
law while the circuits would continue to disagree over the applicable evi-
dentiary law. Many of the same issues that make it desirable for federal
legislation to cover the substantive law apply where evidentiary law is
concerned. 150 In addition, many of the same considerations addressed in
the foregoing conflict of law section' 51 would result in circuit shopping
even if the rule of decision were federal. Yet, the Senate committee con-
sidering these bills has recognized that uniformity among the federal cir-
cuits is an important goal.
152
143. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the text of § 402A, see
supra note 15.
145. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
147. S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1986).
148. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
149. S. 666, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 2823 (1987); S. 687, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2857 (1987); see also S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1986)
(providing that a "section regarding admissibility of evidence" be deleted from the working
draft of this predecessor bill).
150. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984):
Conflicting product liability rules have made it difficult for injured persons to know
their rights and for manufacturers and product sellers to know their obligations.
This has created expensive and burdensome legal costs which are passed on to con-
sumers. The product liability problem has created a serious burden on interstate
commerce, and Federal legislation is needed to address the cause of the problem.
151. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text. "
152. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1984).
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Since Congress is aware of the evidentiary issues in strict liability
claims, the meaning of the silence in the current bills is unclear. Given
the change in previous bills from an extremely strict exclusionary rule to
the most recent predecessor's rule 407-like provision with its rule 403-
like rationale, it is arguable that Congress, by its silence, intends rule
403-which determines the admissibility of all evidence not more specifi-
cally provided for elsewhere-to govern the issue. The focus, however,
of most circuits is not on rule 403, but on rule 407. If Congress truly
intended rule 403 to control, it is likely that Congress would have di-
rected the courts to abandon rule 407 more explicitly.
The opposite argument, that rule 407 should be applied to exclude
remedial measures evidence in strict products liability actions, also
would require Congress to provide a clearer indication of what it wanted
the courts to do. If Congress intended that rule 407 be applied, it should
have directed the minority circuits to follow the current majority and
apply the rule. Finally, perhaps Congress is consciously avoiding the is-
sue and leaving the courts to resolve the conflict. Unfortunately, this
option, which would represent an abdication of legislative responsibility
by Congress, seems to be as likely an interpretation as any.
III. Rule 403 Provides Sufficient and Appropriate Standard
If Congress does adopt a federal products liability law, it should
include a rule for determining the admissibility of remedial measures evi-
dence in strict liability actions. For the reasons discussed above,1 53 an
explicit statement from Congress would be very important in achieving
the goal of uniform administration of products liability cases. Despite
the favor it currently enjoys among the Courts of Appeals, rule 407 is not
an appropriate standard. It provides certainty, but at the expense of con-
sumers who might offer as evidence a manufacturer's design change. In
addition, the rule's benefits are largely speculative, 154 particularly in light
of businesses' admission that they make changes without regard for
whether those actions would be admissible at trial. 55
The most appropriate vehicle for dealing with remedial measures
evidence in strict products liability actions is a rule 403-type standard.
Such a test would focus the judge's inquiry on the actual value of the
evidence and the harm it could do if admitted. It would also highlight
the question whether the evidence is even relevant; that is, tending to
prove any fact at issue in the case. Moreover, it would allow flexibility in
admitting evidence when exclusion would not actually encourage reme-
dial measures by manufacturers. Finally, it would allow a judge to con-
sider as factors in the balancing test the competing policies of
153. See supra notes 17-37 & 149-51 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
155. See Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 128 at 94.
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encouraging remedial measures and of holding manufacturers strictly re-
sponsible for unreasonably unsafe products. In short, it would give trial
judges the discretion to determine whether particular evidence should be
admitted in a particular case. 56 This would provide a more justifiable
and even-handed basis for excluding remedial measures evidence. While
such a rule would leave some uncertainty for manufacturers, it seems
likely that market pressures, insurers, and even the prospect of punitive
damage awards would move them to continue improving their products.
Whether or not Congress passes a substantive products liability law,
it should indicate the appropriate treatment of remedial measures evi-
dence in strict liability cases. At the very least, Congress knows that a
significant problem exists; and since it has tried to address the issue, it
appears that it is not satisfied with the courts' disposition of these cases.
Congress' changing legislative approach to this issue, however, has cre-
ated more confusion. As discussed above, the problems are exacerbated
when states provide the rules of decision.157 The Supreme Court is un-
likely to resolve the problem, since it has declined several opportunities
to do so in recent years. 158 Thus, Congress needs to pass clarifying
legislation.
In the absence of Congressional action in the substantive area, the
appropriate standard for the admissibility of remedial measures in strict
liability actions remains a rule 403-type balancing test. As stated above,
such a standard provides the trial judge with the discretion to consider
the facts of the case in order to determine whether evidence should be
admitted. The factors to be weighed include the competing policies, the
relevancy and probative value of the evidence, and possible jury
confusion.
This approach to the problem has already crept into some courts'
156. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, at 407-20:
[The most desirable approach is to treat products liability cases as governed by Rule
403 rather than Rule 407, thereby giving the judge discretion to admit the evidence
of subsequent repairs where relevance exceeds prejudice to the defendant.
Judge Weinstein would also apply rule 403 for negligence and other actions based on culpable
conduct. Id. at 407-13 ("It would be preferable to abolish rule 407 and to treat the matter [of
subsequent remedial measures] under the general principles of relevancy, relying upon rule 403
for guidance.").
157. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
158. See, eg., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1326-31 (10th Cir.
1983) (rule 407 not applicable; therefore, remedial measures admissible), cert denied sub nor.
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Cann v. Ford Motor
Co., 658 F.2d 54, 559-60 (2d Cir. 1981) (excluded remedial measures under rule 407), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980)
(excluded remedial measures under rule 407), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978) (excluded remedial measures evidence under
rule 407), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
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decisions under the guise of rule 407 policy. 159 The Murray, Herndon,
Grenada, and Cann courts all referred to relevance as an area of inquiry
in strict liability cases. 160 In Herndon, the court pointed out that rule
403's balancing test would always have to be met. 161 Grenada expressly
rested its decision to exclude remedial measures evidence on possible jury
confusion. 62 The Cann court balanced the probative value of the evi-
dence against the danger of prejudice and confusion under rule 403 as a
threshold test.163 It concluded its discussion of rule 407 with a reference
to the confusion that could result if remedial measures were admitted,
since strict liability cases often also include negligence counts. In such
cases, evidence must be excluded from one part of the case, but may be
admitted in another. Thus, formally adopting a rule 403-type test would
merely elucidate the reasoning process some courts are already using. It
would also clarify the reasoning for many other courts by structuring the
analysis and providing specific factors to balance.
In contrast, current analysis based on rule 407 is either too formalis-
tic or unfocused and overexclusive. The formalistic approach ignores the
dangers of admitting remedial measures because the analysis generally
ends when the court determines that rule 407 does not apply. The over-
broad approach to applying the rule results from the narrow focus of rule
407 on the policy of encouraging remedial measures. Judges using this
approach must ignore the probative value such evidence might have and
thwart the policies of liberal admission of relevant evidence and of hold-
ing product manufacturers responsible for unsafe products. The pro-
posed approach would allow judges to take a middle road and consider
all the important factors and policies implicated in admitting or exclud-
ing remedial measures evidence in strict liability cases.
159. See, e.g., supra notes 38-41, 56-61, 96-100 & 109 and accompanying text; see also
Madden, supra note 2, at 9-10.
160. R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d 266, 274 (8th Cir. 1985); Herndon
v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub norL
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., In., 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Grenada Steel Indus.
Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 1983); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658
F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
161. 716 F.2d at 1328-29.
162. 695 F.2d at 888.
163. 658 F.2d at 59-60.
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